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Policymakers generally assume that any tax breaks given to constituents will 
be taken. This seems a natural assumption, since, from the taxpayers' perspec- 
tive, failure to claim a credit is akin to throwing away money. Unless we have 
some reason to believe that taxpayers are ignorant about the credit, we should 
expect them to claim it. It turns out that there is an important exception to this 
general rule. In this paper, we present evidence that many foreign firms act as 
if there is some cost to claiming tax credits or deductions. We  argue that this 
may have an  important impact on our understanding of the effects of corporate 
tax policy in an international setting. 
It is natural to assume that minimizing tax payments is always optimal for 
the firm. F0r'U.S. firms, it has generally been the case that they have no reason 
to avoid taking tax deductions or credits. There was, however, at least one epi- 
sode when this was not true. Indeed, some firms purposely inflated their tax 
payments. A quick summary of this episode will make clear the relevant forces. 
U.S.  firms can account for inventory for tax purposes in many  ways, with 
the two most prominent methods being the last-in-first-out (LIFO) and first- 
in-first-out (FIFO) systems. Firms are not required to actually manage their 
inventories in the way  that they account for them for tax purposes, so they 
should choose whichever method leads to the lowest tax calculation. If there 
is inflation, a firm should calculate its profits for tax purposes using LIFO, 
since the most recently purchased good will be the most expensive, and the 
difference between sale price and cost will be the smallest. In the 1970s, how- 
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ever, there was one catch. If a firm used LIFO to calculate its taxable income, 
then it was required to use LIFO when calculating its accounting profits.’ Ac- 
counting profits are reported to  the  Securities and  Exchange Commission 
(SEC), and are used by stock-market participants (who never see the actual tax 
returns of firms) to value companies. Generally speaking, in the United States 
the methods used to calculate accounting profits are completely separate from 
those used to calculate taxes. There is a good reason for this: the rules that lead 
to the most informative signal to the stock market of the prospects of the firm 
may not be the same rules that lead to the most reliable enforcement of the tax 
code. For LIFO, this separation was violated, leading to a peculiar result. Firms 
sometimes chose to use FIFO instead of LIFO when valuing inventories. The 
most reasonable explanation for this choice is that using LIFO lowered taxes 
by lowering reported profits, and by shifting to LIFO firms might inadvertently 
signal lower profitability to the stock market. Presumably wary of large stock 
declines, firms used FIFO even though this increased total taxes paid to the 
U.S. Treasury (see Shoven and Bulow 1975). 
The LIFO example provides a useful introduction to the discussion of multi- 
national taxation because, for many countries, conformity between the tax and 
accounting books is the rule rather than the exception. In these countries, firms 
do not have to prepare separate tax and accounting reports. Just as conformity 
led some U.S. firms to choose not to use LIFO, it may be that firms based in 
“tax-conformity’’ or “one-book” countries will choose not to take advantage 
of  many tax allowances and investment incentives. This could put them at a 
disadvantage relative  to  firms from  “two-book‘’ countries like the  United 
States, where accounting and tax information are separate. Ignoring tax confor- 
miti when estimating the effects of  taxes on multinational investment may 
provide very misleading inferences. 
Obtaining knowledge of  these effects is becoming increasingly important. 
The array of tax rates and rules facing a typical multinational firm is daunting. 
However, these complex rules present multinationals from most countries with 
strong locational incentives. For example, an investment tax credit (ITC) in the 
United States not only encourages U.S. firms to increase their investment; it 
also may  attract investors from foreign countries. If  the United States were 
considering the reinstitution of  the ITC, policymakers would need to know 
how much additional investment it would induce. A substantial amount of re- 
search has evaluated the responses of  firm investment to tax credits, so the 
analyst might be tempted to use some estimates from this literature to try to 
predict the effects of a credit. Even if  the domestic response estimates were 
very precise, the analyst would probably be incorrect. This is because foreign 
corporations account for a sizable portion of investment in the United States, 
1. Presently, there are footnotes in annual reports that contain the information shareholders 
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and, for a number of reasons, we should expect them to react differently to 
U.S. tax policy than do domestic firms. 
Foremost among these reasons is that income earned in the United States by 
foreign investors is subject to one of two home-country tax systems. Under a 
territorial system, the home country exempts income earned in the United 
States from home-country tax. Under a worldwide system, the home country 
taxes niultinationals on their worldwide income. For an example of why this 
distinction is important, consider the case of a foreign multinational taxed on 
a worldwide basis, with its only foreign operations in the United States. Gener- 
ally, U.S. taxes paid are credited against its home tax liability. If  the home- 
country tax burden is higher than in the United States (as is usually the case), 
then any taxes paid to the United States are irrelevant, since they do not alter 
the firm’s total (sum of U.S. and home-country) tax liability. If the U.S. tax rate 
is raised (but the total burden is still less than that in the home country), the 
U.S. firm’s liabilities are raised, while the foreign multinational’s ultimate tax 
payment is unchanged. Thus, a simple increase in the corporate tax rate bene- 
fits these foreign firms relative to U.S. firms. 
Whether these forces impact capital flows is an important policy question. 
To date, researchers have related foreign direct investment to tax rates in many 
different countries and discovered that investment seems to respond to changes 
in taxes, although substantial uncertainty remains as to the size of these effects. 
This research has followed a long tradition by building upon models wherein 
firms equate the marginal revenue of investment to its marginal cost. The tax 
environment enters the decision to the extent that it alters either side of  that 
equation. An ITC, for example, lowers the cost of each unit of capital. 
In our pfesent research, we argue that this last step, while usually appro- 
priate when analyzing U.S. firms, may be inappropriate when studying multi- 
national firms. As we argued above, many  foreign multinationals exist in an 
environment where it is not always optimal for the decision makers to choose 
to minimize their taxes. Normal marginal cost-marginal  revenue trade-offs 
do not apply for these firms because they operate in a different regulatory envi- 
ronment. Any empirical work that fails to account for this difference will be 
misleading. 
The accounting environments in which firms operate generally fall into two 
classes. While the individual accounting practices differ in certain respects, the 
two systems that represent the ends of the conceptual spectrum are the German 
system (which is one-book) and the American system (which is two-book). To 
capture the core differences, we briefly outline these two benchmark regimes. 
Figure 10.1 summarizes the basic organization of  the U.S. system. In the 
United States, a firm aggregates information received from its subsidiaries into 
a consolidated tax return. The rules for constructing the return are designed by 
the tax authority, and reflect various policy objectives. At the same time, the 
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Fig. 10.1  Corporate taxation regulatory organization: United States 
filed with the SEC. The rules that govern the construction of  this report are 
designed to provide useful valuation information to stakeholders. Of  course, 
accurate information about taxes is important for evaluating the profitability of 
the firm. For this purpose, the consolidated financial statements provide de- 
tailed footnotes about net tax expenses and liabilities. 
Figure 10.2 summarizes the basic organization of the German system. All 
reporting is based on the Commercial Code. Each subsidiary files a separate, 
unconsolidated tax return with the Ministry of  Finance, as does the parent. 
This is the first key difference from the two-book system. In Germany, tax law 
applies at the level of the “legal entity,” not to the entire consolidated company. 
For example, losses by  one branch of  a company can usually not be used to 
offset profits elsewhere in the group (subject to certain profit-sharing condi- 
tions). The Ministry of Finance can also alter accounting rules via the tax law. 
Tax rules can feed back into the reporting practice via the “reverse authoritative 
principle,” which requires firms to use tax rules when constructing their finan- 
cial reports if no relevant rules exist in the Commercial Code. The parent also 
prepares a consolidated statement to present to its shareholders. This group 
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Fig. 10.2  Corporate taxation regulatory organization: Germany 
Note: Umgekehrte Mussgeblichkeits prinzip means reverse authoritative  principle; 
Mussgeblichkeits  prinzip means authoritative  principle. 
rules governing the construction of  this statement have been, except for the 
consolidation itself, generally the same as those applying to the construction 
of the tax return. Hence, German companies exist in an environment similar to 
that faced by  U.S. firms in the LIFO case. Maneuvering recorded in the tax 
return to lower tax liabilities shows up in the individual entity financial state- 
ments, and hence usually in the consolidated statements as well. Since this 
constraint caused U.S. firms to leave tax benefits unused, it is an interesting 
empirical question whether German companies tend to do the same. 
The German system epitomizes one-book countries, but the classification of 
countries into one-book and two-book is something of an art. As we have ex- 
plained, even the United States has features of its tax code that make it look 
like a one-book country. While the definitions are not dichotomous, we can 
map out a rough continuum of countries that fall between the United States 
and  Germany. Countries that  are largely two-book  are Australia, Canada, 
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States.  Countries  that  are  largely  one-book  include:  Belgium,  Denmark, 
France,  Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  Norway,  Spain,  Switzerland, and  Sweden. 
While the majority of countries are one-book, as more countries seek to access 
international capital markets more countries are moving toward the two-book 
system. 
To  study whether there are behavioral differences between firms based in 
one- and two-book countries, we did detailed research on each of the above 
countries’ systems, using the Global Vantage database, which contains, among 
other things, information on the investment decisions of firms in the seventeen 
countries we consider, over a period of  twelve years (Cummins, Harris, and 
Hassett 1994). In the U.S. case, it was easy to identify the effects of informa- 
tion conformity between the two sets of books. One need only count the num- 
ber of  firms not using LIFO that would benefit from the switch (see Shoven 
and Bulow  1975). In the international setting, the problem is more difficult. 
Given the tangled web of tax codes, identification of the optimal tax strategy 
with respect to specific deductions is virtually impossible without having ac- 
cess to the firm’s tax returns. There is an alternative, however. Many of  the 
countries in our sample periodically change their corporate tax systems. As is 
the case in the United States, the value of depreciation deductions is frequently 
altered, and ITCs are switched on and off. These changes allow us to construct 
an experiment that identifies whether firms in one-book countries sometimes 
fail to claim available tax credits. 
In our paper (1994), we develop a model that shows that one important im- 
plication of enforcing conformity between the tax and accounting books is that 
firms will behave as if they face an additional cost every time the firm claims 
a tag deduction. That is, to the extent that taking a tax benefit lowers reported 
income, tax benefits can hamper a firm’s ability to signal profitability to the 
market, and  may  even  signal  a  reduction in  profits.  Thus,  when judging 
whether to invest and claim a tax deduction or credit, a firm must consider the 
extra “signaling” cost incurred if there is a risk that a “bad” signal will be sent 
to the market. We  use the variation in investment policy across countries to 
ascertain whether firms in one-book countries behave as if they face an addi- 
tional cost when responding to domestic investment tax incentives relative to 
two-book firms. For example, when an ITC is introduced in the United States, 
domestic firms increase their investment a certain amount. If  Germany were 
to introduce an ITC identical to the one introduced in the United States, our 
theoretical analysis suggests that German firms would respond less to the in- 
crease than did the U.S. firms, because the German firms face the extra “signal- 
ing” cost. This study of the domestic response is an important precursor to an 
analysis of the specific effects of accounting regime on foreign capital flows. 
If one-book firms do not respond to tax credits in their own country, it is likely 
that credits from other countries will lead to little stimulus as well. 
In our empirical analysis, we find that the one-book, two-book distinction is 
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Roughly speaking, we find that firms in one-book countries respond about half 
as much to changes in tax policy as do firms in two-book countries. This means 
that, for example, an ITC of  about 5 percent in the United States will induce 
about the same amount of extra investment as a 10 percent ITC in a one-book 
country. All told, this means that in addition to controlling for the worldwide- 
territorial distinction when evaluating the winners and losers with respect to 
current tax policy, it is important to control for the home accounting regime as 
well. Our estimates suggest that the extra “signaling” costs borne by firms in 
one-book countries are substantial, and tax changes that appear to advantage 
them may well be-as  would be the case if the benefits to LIFO were improved 
slightly in the United States-inconsequential.  In future research, we will ex- 
pand upon this hypothesis and explore whether historical capital flows between 
countries can be better understood by applying these new insights. 
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